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GREGORY A. FALLS AND DEBRA DRECNIK WORDEN 
Consumer Valuation of 
Protection from Creditor Remedies 
This study investigates the values comumers place on restrictions of 
creditor remedies. The unique data employed were derived from a 1979 
consumer survey taken across four local credit markets that differed 
significantly in their legal environments. The results of binomial logit 
analysis identified the characteristics of consumers who were willing to 
pay for contractual protection from several creditor remedies. A study of 
the dollar amounts that consumers were inclined to pay provided few 
significant results • 
. One aspect of the legal environment for consumer credit is the 
restrictions placed on remedies that creditors may use to collect delin-
quent and defaulted debts. A major change in this legal setting 
occurred on March 1, 1985 when, after ten years of rule making, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published its Credit Practice Rule. 
The regulation prohibits consumer credit contracts from including 
confessions of judgment, waivers that exempt certain property from 
creditor's claims, the assignment of future wages, the non purchase 
money security interests in household goods. It also bans the 
pyramiding of late charges. This ruling affects finance companies, 
retailers, and federal credit unions. The Federal Reserve Board and 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board adopted similar provisions for 
other financial institutions, effective January l, 1986. 1 While a num-
ber of studies have examined the importance of remedies to creditors 
(see, for example, Dunkelberg 1978; Greer 1973; Peterson 1977; and 
Peterson and Frew 1977), very little research has focused on the con-
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'Both the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board were required to 
adopt similar Credit Practice Rules, unless they could assert that the relevant practices were not 
unfair or deceptive as engaged in by banks and saving institutions, respectively. Various issues 
or the Washington Credit Letter (1984 and 1985) discuss these rulings and compare the three 
versions. 
sumers' view of these procedures, even though it is the consumer 
whose "rights" are supposedly protected by the remedy restrictions. 2 
Analysis begun by Peterson and Falls (1981) and continued by 
Peterson (1986) attempted to show that creditors do consider con-
sumers' attitudes about collection procedures. Both studies posited 
that a "goodwill" effect in the marketplace discourages creditors 
from using remedies that are unpopular with current or potential 
clientele. Only if the return provided by the remedy in the collection 
process is greater than the "goodwill" loss will the creditor invoke a 
remedy greatly disliked by consumers. Thus, it was concluded that it 
is not necessary for the majority of consumers to eliminate all 
remedies from credit contracts through legislative action or to bar-
gain directly with creditors to eliminate specific remedies. 
While these two works examined the behavior of creditors 
given consumer attitudes regarding remedies, this analysis more 
closely examines consumer valuation of protection from this type of 
creditor action. In particular, we compare those consumers who 
derive positive values from protection with those who derive none. 
Consumers in this latter group may be injured by mandated restric-
tions on remedies, because creditors adjust prices and other credit 
terms when freedom to invoke remedies is removed. A recent study 
by Barth, Cordes, and Yezer (1986) concluded that such restrictions 
are unlikely to provide net benefits (defined as the change in con-
sumer welfare from the increase in the demand for credit net of the 
decrease in supply) to the typical borrower. Although the approach 
used here is quite different from that of Barth, Cordes, and Yezer, a 
limited comparison is made later. 
The next section introduces the framework for modeling consumer 
valuation of protection from creditor remedies. In the third section 
measures of the factors discussed are introduced, and the model is 
empirically tested. The last section contains concluding remarks. 
'Disagreeing with a portion ofcfhe Credit Practice Rule, the American Financial Services 
Association filed suit against the FTC. The court, finding for the FTC, concluded that the use 
of the disputed remedies would "result in or create a significant risk of substantial economic 
and monetary harm to consumers as well as potential deprivations of their legal rights." 
Washington Credit Letter, August 5, 1985. 
CONSUMER VALUATION MODEL 
Shay (1979) discussed negotiation between creditors and debtors in 
consumer credit contracts. Typically, negotiation is focused on con-
tractual terms such as finance rates, loan maturity, and sales of 
credit insurance, but not on the actions the creditor can take to 
recover all or part of the debt in the event of default. In fact, a credit 
contract usually refers to only some of these remedies and, in the 
event of default, a whole range of legal action not specified in the 
contract is available to creditors-under conditions specified by law. 
Bargaining does not typically occur for such noncontractual items, 
nor is it even customary to bargain over provisions of standardized 
contracts. The existence of transactions and information costs leads 
to the development of such contracts and dissuades individual 
negotiation. 
But the heterogeneity of consumers implies that there also are costs 
to standardized contracts. Since the preferences and default risks of 
consumers differ, benefits from individualized contracts can be 
derived by both creditors and debtors. For example, a borrower who 
recognizes higher default risk because of uncertain future income 
may prefer a contract with a lower interest rate (and smaller pay-
ments) and a security lien on household goods. Another individual 
may receive the benefits of a continuing relationship with the creditor 
that extends from deposit accounts and investments to loans. In these 
instances and others a standardized contract may not be optimal, and 
negotiating contract terms could yield positive net benefits to the par-
ties involved, in spite of transactions and information costs. 
Government regulation of credit terms is also a form of contract 
standardization. In examining the regulatory reform of creditor 
remedies, Shay (1979) defined the invoking of remedies as a property 
right for creditors and protection from them as the debtors' right. 
Referring to Demsetz's (1966) analysis of government intervention in 
the reassignment of property rights, Shay accepted the proposition 
that there are instances when such intervention is desirable. For 
example, if the cost of defining and exchanging rights inhibits 
negotiation. It is recognized that regulatory restrictions on credit 
terms or remedies affect the allocation of a scarce resource-credit. 
This occurs through changes in the prices and terms under which 
credit is granted and to whom it is granted. Thus, before deciding 
that intervention is called for, those consumers who value such 
restrictions should be identified and, if possible, the amount of that 
value determined. 
Johnson (1978) analyzed the cost and benefits of creditor remedies 
for both creditors and consumers. He suggested that the amount a 
consumer would be willing to pay for protection from a particular 
remedy is a good measure of the value derived from restrictions 
imposed on that remedy. This analysis begins by examining the deter-
minants of this value, using the framework developed by Johnson. 
Assume that in the process of obtaining credit, consumers may 
choose to purchase from creditors insurance that guards them from 
specific remedies imposed in response to delinquency or default. For 
simplicity, assume the cost of such insurance takes the form of a one-
time payment made at the beginning of the loan and also that there 
are no transactions or information costs to defining, exchanging, and 
enforcing the agreement. In return for the premium, the creditor 
agrees not to exercise the particular remedy to which the insurance 
applies. The size of the premium that a consumer would be willing to 
pay would depend on the benefit derived from the insurance. This 
benefit (B) is the expected present value of the loss that would be 
incurred if the creditor exercised the remedy but is avoided due to the 
insurance protection. For expository purposes it may be written as: 
B = (PrD) (L) (DIS), (1) 
where PrD is the debtor's subjective probability of delinquency or 
default, L is the value of the loss incurred when the remedy is exer-
cised, and DIS is a factor needed to discount the future loss to the 
present. 3 
Presumably, an individual who believed there was a zero probabil-
ity of ever defaulting on a credit contract would receive no benefit 
from remedy insurance. A greater benefit would be perceived from 
insurance the more the consumer believed in the likelihood of having 
trouble repaying the debt. In other words, an increase in the debtor's 
subjective probability of delinquency or default, PrD, directly 
increases the expected present value of the loss incurred without 
insurance and thus increases the amount the debtor is willing to pay 
for protection. 
0 
• 
'This presentation is similar to Johnson's framework. See Exhibit I of the Appendix for a 
simple numerical example. 
The loss due to the imposition of a creditor remedy, L, is com-
posed of several parts. One is the actual monetary loss which may 
include such items as the market value of repossessed collateral or 
claimed household goods, the amount of a deficiency judgment 
placed on the consumer, late fees, or assessed attorney's fees. An 
increase in any of these values, including the amount outstanding at 
the time of default, increases the benefit derived from the insurance 
coverage and, thus, increases the size of the premium the consumer 
would be willing to pay. 
In addition to the monetary loss, if the creditor imposes remedies 
against a consumer, this action may hinder that consumer's ability to 
obtain credit in the future. To some lenders a deficiency judgment or 
repossession on a consumer's credit record indicates excessively high 
default risk. Thus, another component of Lis the damage to credit-
worthiness that a consumer perceives when a remedy is imposed. A 
portion of this perceived damage is captured by considering the con-
sumer's attitude toward the remedy. Presumably, consumers who 
consider the use of a particular remedy to be so restrictive that it 
should be banned by law would perceive that its imposition would 
severely damage their credit-worthiness. This would increase the loss, 
L, more than would a remedy that the consumer found generally 
acceptable. It is thus hypothesized that consumers are likely to pay a 
higher premium for contractual protection from what they consider 
to be an unacceptable remedy, given the perceived higher benefit 
from the insurance. 
Further, those consumers who are in the stages of their lives when 
the use of credit is greater may perceive more damage from having a 
remedy on their credit records. Thus, it is hypothesized that they also 
would be willing to pay a higher premium to protect their credit-
worthiness than consumers who use less credit for consumption. 
Finally, the likelihood that a remedy would be exercised, and there-
fore appear on a credit history, is influenced by the legal environment 
of the consumer's home state. In those states where lenders are 
restricted from exercising a particular remedy, it is expected that an 
informed consumer would be less willing to pay for protection from 
its use. A second legal aspect is the existence of a binding usury ceil-
ing. Peterson (1986) and others have shown that lenders operating in 
this restricted rate environment are more likely to make use of per-
mitted remedies quickly. Thus, it is hypothesized that an informed 
consumer would be more willing to pay for protection from creditor 
remedies in those states with relatively low loan rate ceilings. Also, 
since lenders faced with binding rate ceilings typically require higher 
minimum loan amounts, the component of L that includes the 
amount of the defaulted loan could be higher in those states. Thus, 
consumers may be willing to pay more for protection. 
The discount factor, DIS, is related to the relative value a con-
sumer places on current versus future consumption. The more highly 
a consumer values current consumption, the larger the opportunity 
cost of foregoing it until later and the smaller the discount factor 
needed to bring future monetary values to the present. Thus, the 
present value of a future loss is smaller to the individual who values 
current consumption more highly. As this loss, calculated in equation 
(1), decreases, it commands a lower insurance premium. 
To reiterate, it is proposed that the up-front premium which an 
individual will pay for protection against the imposition of a creditor 
remedy is the expected present value of the loss that is avoided by 
purchase of the insurance. This value is positively related to the 
potential loss to the debtor, the subjective probability of delinquency 
or default, the existence of a binding rate ceiling in the local credit 
market, and the discount factor. It is negatively related to both the 
consumer's belief that the remedy is acceptable and the degree to 
which a remedy is restricted or prohibited. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
The data used in the analysis are unique-taken from households 
surveyed in four local credit markets that differed significantly in 
their legal environments. 4 The 3,572 households were interviewed in 
early 1979 and resided in Little Rock/North Little Rock, Arkansas; 
Racine/Kenosha, Wisconsin; Waukegan/North Chicago, Illinois; 
and Lake Charles, Louisiana. These areas had similar demographic 
and economic characteristics. But at the time of the survey, the 
Arkansas and Wisconsin markets had generally lower consumer loan 
rate ceilings than the other two. Further, the use of creditor remedies 
was more restricted in Wisconsin and Louisiana than in Arkansas 
and Illinois.' 
'The data are derived from the 1979 National Science Foundation Consumer Survey, con-
ducted by the Credit Research Center, Purdue University. 
'The levels of the rate ceilings in 1979 can be obtained from the authors on request. See 
Exhibit 2 of the Appendix for a description of the remedy restrictions across the four markets. 
TABLE I 
Mean Dollar Amount Consumers Are Willing to 
Pay for Protection from Creditor Remedies 
Attorney's Deficiency 
Late Fees Repossession Fees Judgement 
Overall $47 $132 $112 $ 93 
Life Cycle Stage 
< 45 and married 40 102 105 83 
< 45 and single 55 160 116 112 
Single parent 42 160 116 108 
Married parent 42 102 113 84 
;;;. 45, working 41 119 107 84 
;;;. 45, not in labor force 71 175 140 109 
Credit Market 
Wisconsin 39 84 110 75 
111inois 39 109 105 79 
Arkansas 47 148 117 % 
Louisiana 88 292 136 198 
Expect trouble repaying debts 52 183 141 114 
No trouble repaying debts 40 111 103 84 
In a section of the survey devoted to attitudes about credit, con-
sumers were asked their opinions of ten creditor remedies (see 
Exhibit 3 of the Appendix). They were then presented with a hypo-
thetical loan situation and asked what amount, in the form of a one-
time up-front charge, they would be willing to pay for a written 
agreement granting protection from each of four of the remedies (see 
Exhibit 3 of the Appendix for details). It was implicitly assumed that 
no transactions or information costs were involved in the agreement. 
The four remedies were repossession, the assessment of late charges, 
the assessment of creditor's attorney's fees, and the award of defi-
ciency judgments. 6 
The average dollar amounts consumers were willing to pay for pro-
tection from each remedy, both overall and for various subgroups, 
are reported in Table 1. About one-third of the respondents who 
were willing to pay a premium were unable to state an amount. 
'Consumers' rankings of the listed remedies in order of general acceptance were such that. 
the charging of late fees ranked first, repossession second, the assessment of the attorney's fees 
sixth, and deficiency judgments eighth out of ten possibilities. Of these four remedies, all but 
deficiency judgments were ranked in the top four preferred by creditors. See Tables 2 and 3 in 
Peterson (1986) for these rankings. 
! 
Examination of the mean amounts indicates that Louisiana residents 
and those expecting to have trouble repaying their debts place a 
higher value on protection from each remedy than do citizens of 
other states and those not expecting trouble, respectively. The overall 
mean amount respondents were willing to pay for late fees, $47, sug-
gests that consumers are willing to agree to a .694 percentage point 
increase in the annual percentage rate of interest (APR) on the hypo-
thetical loan to obtain a contract that limits these fees to $1 instead of 
$5 per late payment.' Barth, Cordes, and Yezer (1986) found that 
consumers were willing to pay an additional .045 points APR per one 
dollar decrease in the maximum late charge allowed per month. 
Thus, our results support their findings for this remedy. Similarly, 
the overall averages for attorney's fees and deficiency judgments 
result in an increase of 1.704 and 1.408 points APR, respectively. 
These results are also consistent with the findings of Barth, Cordes, 
and Yezer (1986). However, regression analysis of the reported pre-
miums generally yielded statistically insignificant results. 8 Therefore, 
it appears that at this point the hypotheses summarized at the end of 
the previous section are not supported. 
The fact that approximately one-third of the respondents who 
stated a willingness to pay were unable to give an amount indicates 
the presence of an unspecifiable threshold level below which there is 
no definitive answer regarding the premium. Such a situation sug-
gests the need for a qualitative response model. 9 In addition, the lack 
of any clear pattern in the mean amounts and the paucity of readily 
available market data on the value of protection must cause one to 
wonder whether consumers have enough information to estimate the 
'This figure is determined by subtracting the APR of the hypothetical loan without protec-
tion from the corresponding figure when the insurance is purchased. The 48 month $4,000 loan 
without contractual protection from the $5 late fee has an APR of approximately 12.015. The 
APR with insurance is determined by assuming the same loan and payment situation but with, 
in the case of late fees, a $47 up-front charge. This gives an APR of 12.709. Thus, the dif-
ference of .694 is reported. This difference obviously depends upon a number of factors (e.g., 
the term of the loan) and is offered only as a rough comparison with Barth, Cordes, and Yezer 
(1986). A similar procedure is followed for attorney's fees and deficiency judgments. Barth, 
Cordes, and Yezer did not consider repossession of the purchased good, althugh bans on real 
estate and general security inretests were included. 
'These results are not reported here but are available from the authors on request. 
'By adopting the appropriate normalization for the parameters of such a model, the 
unknown threshold can be set equal to zero (see Amemiya 1981). The authors would like to 
thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
cost to them of the imposition of a remedy reasonably. 10 While con-
sumers may be unable to give an amount, this does not preclude the 
possibility that they can indicate whether protection has any positive 
value to them. Thus, for the above reasons the primary analysis 
focuses on the qualitative question of whether consumers are willing 
to pay for contractual protection at all, not on the amount of the 
payment. 
To analyze the discrete choice problem of whether consumers are 
willing to pay for contractual protection from creditor remedies, a 
binary logit model was selected. This model determines the probabil-
ity that an individual with a given set of attributes will make one 
choice rather than the alternative. The binary dependent variable 
took the value of one if the consumer placed a positive value on pro-
tection from the particular remedy and zero otherwise. 11 The ques-
tions which asked the respondents to ascertain this value and the 
hypothetical loan situation to which it applied are shown in Exhibit 3 
of the Appendix. The explanatory variables are measures of those 
factors which compose equation (1). 
The debtor's subjective probability of delinquency or default, 
PrD, was measured by whether the respondent expected to have trou-
ble repaying debt commitments in the following year or two. To 
quantify this expectation a binary variable, DEF, was created. This 
variable took the value of one if the consumer admitted that chances 
of repayment problems were "very" or "somewhat" likely and zero 
if the chances were "not very" or "not at all" likely. 12 The question 
utilized in constructing DEF is contained in Exhibit 3 of the Appen-
dix. As implied in the theoretical discussion above, the coefficient 
associated with DEF is expecte~ to be positive. 
The hypothetical loan situation in the survey artificially fixed the 
actual monetary loss incurred by the consumer if the remedy was 
imposed. Because, for any particular remedy, this value did not vary 
across the sample, it was not included in the analysis. Other com-
10The first phenomenon may also be attributed to the brevity of the questions asked, the 
hypothetical nature of the situation presented, and the fact that the questions were asked near 
the end of the lengthy survey. 
"In other words, the dependent variable took the value of one for those consumers who 
stated an amount and for those who could not state the exact amount they would pay as a pre-
mium, but did say they would pay something. 
"A continuous variable measuring this subjective probability is desirable, but is not avail-
able from the data base. 
I 
ponents of the loss, L, were estimated. To capture a portion of the 
perceived damage to credit-worthiness when a remedy is imposed, 
this study includes a measure of the consumer's attitude about the 
acceptability of a remedy. Respondents were asked whether lenders 
should be permitted to use a particular remedy in the case of delin-
quency or default. If an individual believed the creditor should not be 
permitted to use the remedy, the variable A TT was assigned the value 
one, zero otherwise. (The question needed to construct this predictor 
is presented in Exhibit 3 of the Appendix.) The coefficient of this 
variable is also expected to be positive. 
Another portion of the perceived damage to credit-worthiness was 
captured by a measure of the life-cycle stage of the debtor household. 
This was accomplished by creating four binary variables. For those 
households in their family formation years, consisting of young (less 
than 45 years of age) married couples, FAMILY took a value of one, 
zero otherwise. YGSNG and SNGPAR were similarly constructed 
for young single people with no children in the home and for single 
parents of any age, respectively. The variable OLDWRK took the 
value one for those households headed by older people still in the 
labor force. Households headed by older people who were either 
retired or otherwise not in the labor force were left in the constant. It 
is expected that this last group of older households, with lower 
demand for credit, should be less concerned about their abilities to 
obtain credit in the future. Thus, insurance protection from the 
damaging of their credit-worthiness is less valuable and commands 
little or no premium. This suggests that the coefficients of each of the 
included variables should be positive. 
The legal setting of the consumer's local credit market was also 
accounted for in the analysis. The variable RR took a value of one 
for the two markets where the creditor remedy was restricted or pro-
hibited, zero otherwise. Given the binding rate ceilings on consumer 
credit in Wisconsin and Arkansas at the time of the survey, the 
variable LRC took a value of one for these two markets, zero other-
wise. In light of earlier theoretical discussion, the coefficient of RR is 
expected to be negative and that of LRC positive. 
Capital market t~~ory is used to derive a proxy for the discount 
factor of equation (l). Capital markets and the ability to borrow and 
lend resources free an individual's consumption pattern from the 
constraint of present income earnings. In particular, the ability to use 
credit allows individuals today to consume more than is allowed by 
current income alone. It is hypothesized that the value of current ver-
sus future consumption is higher and, thus, the discount factor is 
smaller for consumers who have larger amounts of debt relative to 
income. The ratio of outstanding consumer installment debt to 
household income, denoted DEBTRA T, was created to measure this 
consumer preference. This debt measure included revolving credit 
card debt but excluded credit card obligations paid in full each 
month, as well as other lines of credit, rent, and mortgage payments. 
Because an increase in DEBTRA T implies a decrease in the discount 
factor, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative. 
A summary of the independent variables is provided below: 
DEF 
ATT 
FAMILY 
YGSNG 
SNGPAR 
OLDWRK 
RR 
LRC 
•DEBTRAT 
l respondent "very" or "somewhat" likely to have trouble 
repaying debt, 0 if "not very" or "not at all" likely, 
l belief of respondent is that creditor should not be permitted 
to use remedy, 0 otherwise, 
l respondent < 45 and married, 0 otherwise, 
I respondent < 45 and single without children, 0 otherwise, 
1 respondent is single parent, 0 otherwise, 
1 respondent ;;. 45 and in labor force, 0 otherwise, 
I remedy is restricted or prohibited in market, 0 otherwise, 
1 for Wisconsin and Arkansas markets, 0 otherwise, and 
outstanding consumer installment debt/hottsehold income. 
The results of the logit estimation are presented in Table 2. 13 The 
overall fit of the model can be evaluated by the likelihood ratio statis-
tic, - 2logh. This statistic is distributed as a chi square (r), where r 
equals the number of explanatory variables. Similar to the F test in 
ordinary regression analysis, this statistic tests the null hypothesis 
that all coefficients are zero. As reported in Table 2, this hypothesis 
is rejected at the 95 percent level of confidence. Further, for each of 
the four equations, the full logit model correctly predicts about two-
thirds of the consumers' choices. 
The asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood parameter 
estimates allow the use of t-tests for the coefficients of explanatory 
variables. Given the binary nature of each variable, a positive (nega-
tive) significant coefficient indicates that the likelihood that a con-
sumer would pay for protection from the remedy is greater (less) 
when the variable takes the value of one than when it takes the value 
of zero. 
''See McFadden ( 1974) for a derivation of this model and the test statistics associated with it. 
TABLE 2 
Determinants of Consumers' Willingness to Pay for 
Contractual Protection from Creditor Remedies" 
Dependent Variables 
Independent Attorney's Deficiency 
Variables Late Fees Repossession Fees Judgment 
DEF 0.16• 0.68• 0.47• 0.74• 
(4.63) (5.07) (3.07) (5.41) 
ATT 0.21• 0.30• 0.06 0.28• 
(2.51) (2.89) (0.57) (2.74) 
Life Cycle 
FAMILY 0.06 0.08 0.30• -0.09 
(0.44) (0.58) (1.66) (0.60) 
YGSNG 0.55• 0.42° 0.95° 0.34* 
(3.11) (2.35) (4.53) (1.83) 
SNGPAR 0.28 0.29 0.44• 0.12 
(I.53) (I.54) (1.94) (0.64) 
OLDWRK -0.01 -0.ll 0.24 -0.17 
(0.04) (0.73) (1.25) (1.08) 
RR -0.23• -0.24• -0.29° -0.27* 
(2.49) (2.55) (2.64) (2.70) 
LRC 0.12 0.19* 0.19° 0.16 
(1.35) (1.98) (1.76) (1.51) 
DEBTRAT -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.45) (0.50) (0.05) (0.86) 
Constant 1.22• 1.22• 1.66• 1.30" 
(8.87) (8.79) (9.49) (8.59) 
n 2576 2535 2211 2457 
-2log>. 61.5* 75.1 • 51.7* 68.0* 
OJo correctly 
predicted 620Jo 630Jo 660Jo 640Jo 
•The absolute value of the t-ratio is given in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. 
•Significant at the 95070 level of confidence, one-tailed test. 
For all four remedies the coefficient of DEF is significantly posi-
tive and, thus, meets a priori expectations. This indicates that con-
sumers who anticipated having trouble meeting debt commitments 
were more willing to pay for protection from these remedies than 
those who did not expect such problems. 
The attitude variable (ATT) significantly captures consumers' per-
ceived losses from the imposition of remedies. Except for protection 
from attorney's fees, those consumers who believed a remedy was 
unacceptable were more likely to pay for protection. As expected, 
young single persons were more willing to contract for protection 
against remedies than households headed by older people not in the 
labor force. The coefficients on the other life-cycle variables were not 
statistically significant. Additional analysis of this data (not pre-
sented here) indicated that these young single consumers were sig-
nificantly more likely to shop for the best deal before signing a credit 
contract. 
Holding all other factors constant, consumers borrowing in mar-
kets where the imposition of remedies was restricted were less willing 
to pay for protection from the remedies. In partial accord with prior 
expectation, the presence of binding rate ceilings has a significantly 
positive effect on consumers' willingness to contract for protection 
from repossession and the payment of attorney's fees, but they have 
no effect for the other two remedies. 
The variable DEBTRA T is insignificant for all remedies. This sug-
gests that the discount factor is not an empirically important varia-
ble. Several alternatives to DEBTRAT were also utilized, with similar 
results. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the consumers' view of 
restrictions on remedies imposed by lenders in case of delinquency or 
default on a loan contract. In particular, we chose to investigate what 
factors influence the value consumers place on protection from these 
creditor actions. 
Although we were unable to capture the determinants of how 
much consumers would be willing to pay for protection, analysis of 
their willingness to pay yielded significant results. This analysis 
implied that the consumers in our sample were aware of the factors 
which affect the cost they would incur when a remedy is exercised. 
For instance, consumers who acknowledged a higher risk of default 
were more willing to pay for protection from creditor remedies, 
under the realization that the remedial action was more likely to be 
imposed. 
The sample data were drawn from credit markets that differed in 
the level of interest rate ceilings and restrictions of remedies. With 
this data we ascertained that consumers seem aware of the legal 
environment that influences the imposition of remedies. In sum, we 
found evidence that, in the absence of transactions costs, some con-
sumers recognized a positive value of protection from creditor 
remedies, while others found no need for it. Further, the former were 
willing to pay lenders to obtain such protection. 
However, as indicated by the analysis of how much they would pay 
for protection from creditor remedies, consumers may be unable to 
appraise the potential harm of such creditor action. Such imperfect 
borrower knowledge could be corrected through public education or 
through legislation which mandates that lenders provide more com-
plete information themselves. 
APPENDIX 
EXHIBIT 1 
Assume that, on a three month loan, a consumer estimates that a 
$1,000 loss, L, is incurred if a default occurs at any time during the 
term of the loan. This $1,000 includes both the monetary loss and 
any damage to the debtor's credit-worthiness. The consumer believes 
that there is only a ten percent probability that the loan will be 
defaulted at some time during the term of the contract. In the event 
of default, there is a 50 percent chance that it will happen during the 
first month, a 30 percent chance and a 20 percent chance it will hap-
pen during the second and third months, respectively. 
Given a twelve percent annual discount rate-that is, the consumer 
is indifferent between $100 today and $112.68 in one year (assuming 
monthly compounding)-the expected present value of the loss from 
default is 
.10[.50(.990 x $1000) + .30(.980 x $1000) + .20(.971 x $1000)) = $98.32 
The consumer would benefit by $98.32 if this loss could be avoided. 
EXH/B/T2 
Creditor Remedy Restrictions in Survey States in 1979 
State 
Restriction Arkansas Illinois Louisiana Wisconsin 
Overall level of Not highly Not highly 
restrictive 
Highly restrictive Highly restrictive 
restrictions 
Late payment 
charges 
Repossession 
Assessment of 
attorney's fees 
Deficiency 
judgments 
restrictive 
No provision Lesser of $10 or 
Slllo 
Lesser of max. 
rate, 3117o or $5 
Lesser of $3 or 
3117o 
Self-help allowed Self-help allowed "Sequestration" Requires prior 
under UCC under UCC requires replevin judicial process 
by legal 
authority 
Limited to 101170 Reasonable fees Up to 25117o of Prohibited in 
of principal + allowed balance due consumer credit 
interest 
Allowed under Allowed but No provision but Prohibited for 
ucc may not be recovery of loans under 
available in deficiencies is Sl,000 
some cases prohibitively 
expensive 
Source: Peterson and Falls (1981), "Costs and Benefits of Restrictions on Creditors' 
Remedies," Working Paper No. 41, Credit Research Center, Purdue University. 
EXHIBIT3 
Questions on Consumers' Attitudes Towards Remedies 
Sometimes people have difficulty in paying their debts and fall 
behind in their payments. When this happens, creditors have several 
courses of action that they may follow. In your opinion, which of 
these should a creditor be permitted to do to collect a debt that is 
owed? To ascertain consumer attitudes they were then asked: 
Charge an extra fee if payments are late by 30 days or more? 
Renegotiate the loan with lower monthly payments, but at a higher 
interest rate? 
Call the consumer at regular intervals to remind him that the debt 
must be paid? 
Contact the consumer's employer about the debt owed? 
Take back the item purchased on credit? 
Take back and sell the item purchased, then sue for any amount 
owed but not covered by the sale? 
If no particular item was purchased with the loan, take household 
goods and sell them to pay off the debt? 
Ask an employer to take part of the consumer's wages to pay off 
the debt? 
Legally force the consumer to pay the creditor's legal fees if the 
creditor has to sue? 
Legally force the consumer to use money in savings accounts to 
pay off the debts? 
Questions on Consumers' Willingness to Pay for Remedy Protection 
At times some people have difficulty repaying loans. This could 
happen because of unexpected layoffs, job losses, sickness, death, or 
family financial problems. When people fall behind on their pay-
ments, lenders ·may use a number of legal "remedies" to try and get 
their money back. We are interested in how much extra money peo-
ple might be willing to pay in order to borrow money from a lender 
who agreed in writing that he would not use certain "remedies" in 
collecting money owed. 
Suppose you borrowed $4,000 for 48 months for a new car. You 
would have to pay back approximately $1,000 in finance charges on 
the loan in addition to the $4,000 borrowed. To ascertain how much 
consumers would be willing to pay for protection from the assess-
ment of the lender's attorney's fees, they were asked: 
How much extra in a one-time charge or fee would you be willing 
to pay to borrow from a lender who would give you a loan con-
tract that would not make you pay his attorney's fees (which might 
be as much as $300) if he had to sue you to collect on the loan? 
To ascertain how much consumers would be willing to pay for pro-
tection from paying late charges, they were asked: 
Many lenders can assess "late charges" if your payment is more 
than two weeks late. If a lender would agree to assess a late charge 
of $1 rather than $5 for each payment overdue, how much extra 
would you be willing to pay in a one-time charge or fee to obtain a 
$4,000, 48-month loan from such a lender? 
If a borrower stopped paying on an auto loan when he still owed 
$2,000 and the car was worth only $1,500, the lender can take back 
the car and then sue for the extra $500. To ascertain how much con-
sumers would be willing to pay for protection from repossession, 
they were asked: 
How much extra would you be willing to pay in a one-time charge 
or fee to obtain a $4,000, 48-month new car loan from a lender 
who agreed that if you stopped paying, he could only sue for the 
balance due on the loan ($2,000) but could not take back the car? 
To ascertain how much consumers would be willing to pay for pro-
tection from the awarding of a deficiency judgment to lenders, they 
were asked: 
Now, suppose the lender agreed that if the borrower stopped pay-
ing, the lender would only take back the car (worth $1,500) but 
would not sue for the difference ($500). How much extra in a one-
time charge or fee would you pay for such an agreement? 
Questions on Consumers' Subjective Probability of Default 
How likely do you think it is that you might have trouble repaying 
some of your debts in the next year or two. Would you say it is ... 
Very likely 
Somewhat likely 
Not very likely 
Not at all likely 
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